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~OCKY MOUNTAIN GIANT 








Case No. 15553 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an action in contract wherein the Defendant-
Appellant agreed to purchase from Plaintiff-Respondent certain 
tires for recapping purposes. Respondent seeks recovery from 
Appellant in the sum of $5,575.00 plus interest and costs as 
payment for a portion of the subject tires which Appellant rejected 
as being unrecappable and of no value. Respondent does not 
necessarily dispute Appellant's assessment of the condition 
and quality of the rejected tires, but rather claims that Appell-
ant agreed to purchase all of the subject tires without regard 
to inspection or fitness for recapping purposes, and, in effect, 
agreed to assume the risk of taking the bad along with the 
good, 
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B. Disposition in the Lower Court. 
Judgment was entered for the Plaintiff-Respondent as 
prayed in the sum of $5,575.00 plus costs. The court also 
awarded Respondent pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at 
the respective per annum rates of 6 and 8 per cent. 
c. Relief Sought on Appeal. 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the trial court and 
judgment in its favor, as a matter of law, to the effect that 
the evidence and findings do not support the judgment entered 
below, or, in the alternative, remand the matter to the trial 
court for further findings of fact crucial to a proper dispositL 
of this case as hereinafter set forth. 
D. Statement of Facts. 
Both parties are in the tire business. Respondent 
is engaged in the retail tire business. Appellant's branch 
in Tucson, Arizona (hereinafter referred to as "Appellant") is 
primarily engaged in the business of recapping and selling large 
truck tires used in mining operations (TR. 126, 127). 
Some time prior to September of 1975, these parties 
entered into an oral agreement wherein Appellant agreed to pur· 
chase from Respondent certain used tires discarded at the Kenne· 
cott Copper Mine operation, with the intent of recapping them 
for resale to mining operations in Arizona. 
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Prior to shipment of the subject tires, employees of 
both parties looked over some of the tires at Kennecott which were 
potentially to become part of this agreement. Respondent claims 
that Appellant's employee saw 80 per cent of the subject tires 
on that occasion (TR. 115, 11. 28-29; 116, 11. 19-24). 
Shipments began on September 16, 1975, and continued 
through November 6, 1975 (P. Ex. 1). The last shipment of 
tires arrived at Appellant's place of business prior to 
clovember 29, 1975 (TR. 121, 11. 9-19). The aggregate amount 
of invoices covering all 70 tires is $15,100.00. 
During the period of time between October 24 and December 
19, 1975, Appellant made three payments for tires received and 
accepted by it, and Respondent credited Appellant's account in an 
amount equal to the aggregate price of 11 tires, which, after 
inspection, Appellant rejected as being unrecappable. The 
agqregate sum of these three payments and credits given is 
$9,525.00, leaving a balance of $5,575.00. Appellant maintains 
that this amount covers tires which it found to be unrecappable 
in addition to the 11 for which credit was admittedly given. 
Respondent makes no contention that the disputed tires were 
not defective, but rather maintains that Appellant agreed to 
purchase them without regard to their condition. Herein lies 
the heart of this case, i.e., did Appellant unconditionally 
agree to purchase all tires which Respondent elected to ship, 
or did it, rather, retain the right of reasonable inspection 
and rejection of defective goods? 
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It is important to note that the used tires which a;c 
the subject of the disputed agreement are large and expensi~, 
the average retail price of one, for example, in recapped cone::, 
is approximately $7 ,000. 00 (TR. 129, 11. 25-30). Defects in 
such tires which prevent recapping are only ascertainable after 
each tire is subjected to certain sophisticated mechanical 
procedures (TR. 129, 11. 10-30.). In any event, a determinatk 
of the recappabili ty of any such tire cannot be made by visual 
inspection alone (TR. 116, 3-14; 127, 11. 25-27). Appellant 
contends that after subjecting each tire to the necessary 
inspection procedures, it found many to be unrecappable which 
it rejected and was under no obligation to accept. It is for 
those particular tires that Respondent seeks payment in this acj 
Some time after the last shipment of tires, Responde:,: 
employee and only witness at trial, Ralph D. Albertson, met wi:' 
Appellant's employees on or about November 29, 1975, for the 
purpose of ascertaining and collecting the outstanding balance 
of payments due on all tires subject to these transactions (TR.i 
11, 6-11; 111, 11. 7-8). Two important things resulted fromt: 
meeting. First, there was a discussion regarding defective ti:· 
and the manner of their disposal (TR. 122, 11. 4-20). Second, 
during the course of the meeting, a statement of Appellant's 
account was computed showing the outstanding balance to be 
$ 4 , 8 2 5 . 0 0 (TR. 118 , 11. 12 - 19 ; 119 , 11. 4 - 8 ; 12 0 , 11 · 1 -14 ; 
142, 11. 27-30; 143, 11. 1-14; 159, 11. 2-9; 162, 11. 13- 26 ; 
D. Ex. 15). 
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Pursuant to Respondent's instructions, Appellant 
removed the defective tires to a local landfill at its own 
expense. Shortly thereafter, it received notification from 
Respondent to "hold all tires that you reject from this company. 
These tires must be rejected in the presence of both parties 
and proper credit invoices written." (P. Ex. 8). 
Inasmuch as Appellant had already carried to a conclusion 
the instructions to scrap the bad tires, it sent a letter of 
explanation, dated December 10, 1975 (P. Ex. 10), apprising 
Respondent of the fact that the disputed tires were available 
for its inspection or use at the Tucson landfill. Respondent 
made no effort at this time, or on any occasion, to conduct 
its own inspection of those tires which were rejected by Appellant. 
Appellant testified, in fact, that on the occasion of November 
29, 1975, it invited Respondent's employee to inspect the rejected 
tires; Respondent denies this, but does not aver that it was 
ever prevented from inspecting the rejected tires. 
In short, it was clear from the outset of these trans-
actions that the tires were to be purchased for recapping purposes. 
Not all of the tires were recappable. Appellant maintains that 
there were many defective tires in addition to those 11 for which 
credit was given (P. Ex. 2). Respondent did not re-inspect the 
bad tires following notification of their rejection, although 
it had opportunities to do so, and does not contend that the 
rejected tires were in fact recappable. Its contention is 
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simply once Appellant visually inspected a portion of the tire:. 
it agreed to purchase all 70 without the right to inspect therr. 
further or reject those unfit for recapping. 
POINT I 
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT DO NOT 
SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT ENTERED FOR PLAINTIFF 
BELOW, ROCKY MOUNTAIN GIANT TIRE SERVICE, 
INC., IN THE SUM OF $5,575.00. 
Depending on one's point of view, the findings of th: 
trial court entered in support of its judgment for Plaintiff~ 
either fatally inconsistent or fatally incomplete. In either 
event, they are inadequate to support the judgment entered bel:. 
The threshold question, and the pivotal point of thi: 
lawsuit, was correctly identified by the trial judge wherein h: 
stated at the conclusion of closing argument, " ..• it seems t·: 
me that I have got to determine what the agreement between 
these parties was. . . " (TR. 177, 11. 6-7). More specifica: 
I 
the issue is whether the Appellant agreed to pay for all tires· 
shipped by Respondent, regardless of whether each tire was 
recappable and, therefore, of value to Appellant, or whether 
Appellant agreed to pay for all tires received by it from Resf: 
dent which, after inspection, were found to be recappable· 
A review of the record below reveals that the trial 
court failed to carry to a conclusion its expressed intention' 
determining the nature of the agreement as between these part!' 
as to this particularly crucial issue. No finding was enterec 
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below as to whether or not the sale of the subject tires was 
conditioned upon their fitness for which they were purchased, 
i.e. , recapping. 
In deference to the trial court and the prevailing party 
below, it may be argued that inasmuch as the evidence, findings 
and judgment below must be viewed in the light most favorable 
to Respondent and every reasonable inference favorable to Res-
pondent must be drawn therefrom, Kimball Elevator Co. v. Elevator 
Supplies Co., 2 Ut.2d 289, 272 P.2d 583 (1954), one must conclude 
that the trial court inferentially found the subject agreement 
to be unconditional to the exclusion of the buyer's right of 
reasonable inspection and rejection of non-conforming goods. 
The supportive reasoning for this argument would be that the 
trial court found (1) that ". . • the defendant purchased from 
the plaintiff a quantity of used tires for an agreed total 
purchase price of $15, 100. 00. . . . " (TR. 82, Findings of 
Fact #3); and (2) that after subtracting all payments and credits 
from the foregoing amount there remained unpaid the sum of 
$5,575.00 (TR.83, Findings of Fact #4); therefore, the court 
inferentially found that Appellant agreed to take the "bad 
apples" along with the good ones and pay for them all. 
Although this reasoning and conclusion may have some 
limited persuasive appeal at first blush, a serious consideration 
of the record below shows that it is not only unsupported by 
the evidence, as set forth in Point II hereafter, but such an 
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inference is precluded by the express findings of the court. 
A further refinement of the aforementioned standard of review ~ 
that a missing finding of fact can be implied if its implicatior. 
would be in harmony with the other express findings. Northern 
Oil Co. v. Industrial Commission, 140 P.2d 329 (1943). To infe: 
that the agreement was unconditional and that the purchase of 
the tires in question was not made subject to the right of reasc 
inspection and the right to reject defective goods, is to draw 
an inference which is incompatible with the express finding of 
the court that 
••. [O]n November 10, 1975, the plaintiff 
issued a credit to the defendant for 11 of 
said tires shipped by plaintiff to defendant 
as aforesaid on November 6, 1975; that said 
credit for $2,375.00 was for such 11 tires 
found to be unuseable and rejected by 
defendant through its manager in Tucson, 
Arizona. (TR. 82, Finding of Fact #3.) 
Certainly it cannot be said or reasonably inferred 
from the evidence and other findings of the court below that t\ 
purchase of tires was not made subject to the right of inspect:: 
and fitness of goods while at the same time expressly admittin~ 
that the Respondent agreed to, and did in fact, credit the 
Appellant's account for the defective tires. 
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POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE ADMITTED BELOW DOES NOT 
SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
The Standard of Review 
If the express findings of fact of the trial court 
are disregarded and the blind inference drawn that Appellant 
agreed to purchase the subject tires from Respondent without 
regard to their condition and without the right of reasonable 
inspection, then we must turn our consideration to the evidence, 
if any, in support of such inference. A finding whether express 
or implied cannot stand without adequate basis in the evidence. 
In contrast with other jurisdictions, such as Arizona, 
California, Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma and Oregon, which merely 
require "some or any evidence" to support the findings of the 
trial court on appeal, (3 Pacific Digest "Appeal & Error", hn. 
1010.1(3), supp.) this court has established a somewhat higher 
standard of review regarding the quantum and quality of evidence 
required to support findings of fact challenged on appeal. This rule 
is simply that the findings and judgment of the trial court 
will not be disturbed on appeal if there be substantial and 
competent evidence in the record to support them. Mineer v. 
Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 572 P.2d 1364 (Ut. 
1977); Ash v. State, 572 P.2d 1374 (Ut. 1977); R. C. Tolman 
Construction co. , Inc. v. Myton Water Association, 56 3 P • 2d 
780 (Ut. 1977); Dockstader v. Walker, 29 Ut.2d 370, 510 P.2d 
526 (1973). on another occasion, this court referred to "this 
same well-worn and time-honored rule of review .• ·" in similar 
but somewhat different language by stating that where there 
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was "substantial, reasonable and credible evidence" to support 
the trial court's findings, a reviewing court will not upset 
them on appeal. Keller v. Deseret Mortuary Co., 23 Ut.2d 1, 
455 P.2d 197 (1969). 
The Evidence 
The evidence submitted at trial is insufficient to 
support either an implied finding of fact to the effect that 
the purchase agreement was unconditional, or the express findinc; 
that the agreed total purchase price was $15,100.00 (TR. 82, 
Finding of Fact #3) and that, ". . • there remains due and owing : 
from the defendant to the plaintiff the sum of $5,575.00." 
(TR.83, Finding of Fact #4). With respect to the evidence 
in this regard, there are six important points to take into 
consideration. 
First, the Respondent established by its own evidence 
(P. Ex. 2) and the court found (TR.82) that on November 10, 
1975, the Respondent credited the account of Appellant for 
11 tires which Appellant inspected and found to be unrecappable. 
Obviously, Respondent would not have allowed a credit for bad 
tires if the agreement required Appellant to pay for all tires, 
whether good or bad, and, for the sake of argument, even if 
the original agreement had been unconditional, Respondent's 
conduct in giving credit for bad tires modified the original 
agreement to the effect of making it conditional upon inspectic: 
and fitness for recapping. In this regard, it is important 
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to understand, that ~ore than the 11 tires covered by this 
credit were found to be unrecappable. In fact, all of the 
tires subject to the judgment entered herein for the sum of 
$5,575.00 fall into that category. (TR. 173, 11. 11-14.) 
Second, on November 29, 1975, Respondent met with 
Appellant in Tucson, Arizona. In regard to that meeting, Respon-
dent's witness, along with Appellant's witness, testified that 
Respondent instructed and authorized Appellant to dispose of any 
and all bad tires. 
Q. (By Mr. Lewis) All right. Now, let me 
review this conversation that you had 
with Mr. Murken in Arizona November 28th, 
29th. Do you recall in that conversation 
in which Mr. Murken told you that all of 
the tires, the rejected tires were right 
there in the lot and you could go inspect 
them and you said, "No, I don't need to 
inspect them," basically and then he said, 
"Shall we discard them?" You said, "Go 
ahead and discard them." Do you recall 
that conversation? 
A. Only part of it. 
Q. All right. Tell me which part you remember. 
A. The part of discarding the tires. 
Q. And you -- did you tell him to go ahead 
and discard the tires? 
A. The ones that were junk, if there were any. 
Q. All right. So if there were junk tires 
you told him to go ahead and discard them? 
A. If there were any, yes. 
(TR. 122, 11. 4-21.) 
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Respondent's instruction and authorization to Appellan: 
to discard the bad tires is again indicative of the fact that 
both parties understood the sale to be subject to reasonable 
inspection and the right of rejection for defective goods. rt 
should also be noted that once Respondent gave instructions to 
discard the bad tires, Appellant had no other alternative but 
to comply. 70A-2-603(1) u.c.A. (1953, as amended) provides: 
Subject to any security interest in the 
buyer (subsection (3) of section 70A-2-711), 
when the seller has no agent or place of 
business at the market of rejection a mer-
chant buyer is under a duty after rejection 
of goods in his possession or control to 
follow any reasonable instructions received 
from the seller with respect to the goods. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Third, pursuant to Respondent's testimony, the purpose 
of the meeting of November 2 9, 19 7 5, was to determine and callee: 
the balance of the unpaid purchase price for the subject tins 
from Appellant (TR. 118, 11. 6-11; TR. 188, 11. 2-4). This acco:' 
ing was final inasmuch as Appellant had received from Responden: i 
shipment of all of the subject tires prior to that occasion (TR. 
121, 11. 2-21; TR. 140, 11. 1-3). On that occasion, these partii 
mutually agreed that the remaining balance on the unpaid purchas:' 
price was $4,825.00 (TR. 119, 11. 4-8; TR. 120, 11. 12-14; TR.! 
11. 17-19). Accordingly, on that same occasion, these parties 
prepared an accounting of all billable tires (D. Ex. 15) (TR.:' 
11. 29-30; TR. 159, 11. l-9; TR. 142, 11. 15-30). 
It is obvious that the final accounting of billable 
tires as represented by Defendant's Exhibit 15, did not accoun: 
for all tires shipped and invoiced by Respondent. In fact, a 
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quick tally of tires accounted for by Defendant's Exhibit 15 
equals 35, whereas Respondent shipped and invoiced 70 tires 
(P. Ex. 1). The fact that this accounting did not cover all of 
the tires shipped regardless of their condition is further evi-
dence that Appellant was not to be held liable for those tires 
found to be unrecappable after adequate inspection procedures. 
Fourth, within a week following the meeting of 
November 29, 1975, Respondent sent a letter (P. Ex. 8) dated 
December 5, 1975, which stated: 
Please be advised to hold all tires that 
you reject from this company. These tires 
must be rejected in the presence of both 
parties and proper credit invoices written. 
Because of the anticipatory language of this communication, 
it is clear that it refers to bad tires in addition to and apart 
from those 11 already covered by Respondent's credit memorandum of 
November 10, 1975 (P. Ex. 2). The expressed intent of Respondent 
therein is to inspect tires rejected by Appellant and prepare 
"proper credit invoices" for those additional tires that were 
unrecappable. 
This communication of December 5, 1975, also shows 
the nature of the agreement as between these parties, i.e., 
that the purchase of tires by Appellant was subject to reasonable 
inspection and conditional upon their fitness for recapping 
purposes. Respondent clearly expressed its intention therein 
to accommodate the Appellant with "proper credit invoices" for 
all bad tires. 
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Fifth, because of the size and kind of tires invo~~ 
a determination cannot be made as to whether or not a particuli:' 
tire is recappable without first subjecting the tire to sophist:, 
inspection procedures. The undisputed evidence submitted to 
the trial court in this regard established that the old rubber 
must first be removed by a de-treading machine, some times 
known as a "buffer". At this point a visual inspection is 
made primarily to determine how many cord bodies are exposed. 
If the tire passes this first step, it is then placed in an 
open steam kettle for a couple of hours and again inspected 
for separations. At this point, a final determination is made 
as to whether or not the tire is recappable. (TR. 129, 11. 7-1: 
In any event, both parties agree that the recapping 
potential of these tires is not subject to evaluation by visual 
inspection, but requires the assistance of the mechanical proc0 
described. 
Appellant) 
(TR. 116, ll. 3-14 - Respondent; TR. 127, 11. 24-30 · 
Because of the difficulty in determining the recappinc 
potential of one of the subject tires, the trial judge erred in 
analogizing the transaction between these parties to the sale 
and purchase of a carload of apples (TR. 176, 11. 28-30; 177 
ll. 1-2). Whereas, the quality and fitness of apples for 
any particular purpose can readily be determined by visual 
inspection, the goods in this case are clearly of a different 
nature and are not so easily inspected. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 15 -
Respondent also testified that when Appellant's repre-
sentative was in Utah to negotiate the terms of this purchase 
agreement, he didn't bother to even look at all of the tires that 
were to potentially become part of the sale (TR. 116, 11. 19-24). 
That fact, coupled with the requisite inspection procedures and 
Respondent's lack of equipment to conduct such inspections in 
Salt Lake City, Utah (TR. 20, 11. 10-14), are clearly indicative 
of the fact that Appellant never intended to bind itself to 
purchase all tire which Respondent elected to ship; if that 
were the case, Appellant would have at least looked at every 
tire it was to become obligated to purchase. 
Sixth, Appellant's witness testified as follows: 
Q. [Appellant's counsel] Now, do you 
recall any conversation with Mr. 
Albertson [Respondent's employee] 
regarding your inspection of the tires? 
A. All tires were subject to inspection 
and that was the conversation that was 
understood by both parties, that there 
was no way he could receive monies from 
Brad Ragan without the tires being 
inspected. 
(TR. 128, 11. 28-30; 129, 11. 1-3; see 
also TR. 127, 11. 13-19; 128, 11. 24-27.) 
On the other hand, the only scrap of evidence in support 
of Respondent's contention that the subject purchase agreement was 
unconditional was the self-serving testimony of its only witness. 
Q. [Appellant's counsel] And that's why 
they took these tires to inspect them 
and determine if they are recappable? 
A. He bought them as is here with his 
inspection and my inspection. 
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Q. Then is it your testimony that the two 
of you went over all the tires or only 
a portion of the tires? 
A. I said 80 per cent of the tires. 
Q. And do you want this court to believe 
that 20 per cent of the tires he bought 
sight unseen? 
A. Correct. 
{TR. 116, 11. 15-25) 
Appellant contends that the trial judge failed to make
1 
the important finding of fact as to the primary issue of this ' 
I 
case regarding whether or not the purchase agreement was condit:J 
upon inspection and fitness of the tires. That finding cannot:,. 
~ 
inferred from the decision of the trial court, and at the same 
time find harmony with the express findings entered below. But, 
even if such a finding could be implied, or if the express find:'i 
were given that effect, which Appellant contends cannot reasona:\ 
r 
be done, the evidence is nevertheless insufficient to support 1 
such a finding whether express or implied as shown by the fore· 1 
going six points. 
Lest there be any misunderstanding, this Appellant 
does not ask the court to rule in its favor merely because 
the evidence preponderates against the Respondent on this issue: 
but, rather, because there is no substantial and competent 
evidence to support a finding, whether express or implied, 
that the subject purchase agreement was unconditional. It 
should also be mentioned that not only does the evidence sh~ 
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that the parties intended for the sale to cover only those tires 
which were, in fact, recappable, but the controlling law protects 
Appellant's right of reasonable inspection and rejection of 
non-conforming goods as well. In this regard, ?OA-2-513(1) and 
(4), U.C.A. (1953, as amended), states: 
Unless otherwise agreed and subject to 
subsection (3), where goods are tendered 
or deliveredor identified to the contract 
of sale, the buyer has a right before pay-
ment or acceptance to inspect them at any 
reasonable place and time and in any reason-
able manner. When the seller is required 
or authorized to send the goods to the buyer, 
the inspection may be after their arrival. *** 
(4) A place or method of inspection fixed 
by the parties is presumed to be exclusive 
but unless otherwise expressly agreed it 
does not postpone identification or shift 
the place for delivery or for passing the 
risk of loss. If compliance becomes imposs-
ible, inspection shall be as provided in 
this section unless the place or method 
fixed was clearly intended as an indispen-
sable condition failure of which avoids the 
contract. 
Comment No. 2 of the Official Comments of the Uniform 
Conunercial Code §2-602, adopted in this jurisdiction as ?OA-2-602 
U.C.A., also states that the buyer's right to receive conforming 
goods implies a right of reasonable inspection. If after 
inspection the buyer (in this case Appellant) discovers some 
of the goods to be defective, his right of rejection of all 
or part of the goods is protected by §70A-2-60l: 
Subject to the provisions of this chapter on 
breach in installments contracts (section ?OA-2-
612) and unless otherwise agreed under the 
sections on contractual limitations of remedy 
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(sections 70A-2-718 and 70A-2-719), if the 
goods or the tender of delivery fail in any 
respect to conform to the contract, the buyer 
may 
{a) reject the whole; or 
(b) accept the whole; or 
{c) accept any commercial unit or units 
and reject the rest. 
The Conditional Agreement 
If one concludes as the Appellant contends that the 
agreement was conditional, and that there is no substantial 
competent evidence to support a finding whether express or 
implied that the agreement excluded the rights df reasonable 
inspection and rejection of defective goods, three additional 
questions must then be addressed: 
(1) Other than the 11 defective tires covered by 
Respondent's credit memorandum of November 1 O, 19 7 5, were there 
additional defective tires received by Appellant from Respondent: 
(2) If so, did Appellant properly notify Respondent 
of the same and provide an opportunity for their inspection? 
(3) Did Appellant pay Respondent for all recappable 
tires which it received? 
(1) There were many defective tires in addition to 
those 11 for which credit was properly given. In fact, all of 
the tires which constitute the goods covered by the trial court' 
judgment for $5,575.00 were not recappable. Respondent shipped 
70 tires (P. Ex. 1). Only 35 of those proved to be recappab~ 
(D. Ex. 15 and 13). It is undisputed that the 11 tires covered 
by Respondent's credit memorandum of November 10, 1975, were 
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defective. There is no evidence in the record to show, however, 
that all of the balance of the tires were recappable. In fact, 
all of the evidence on this point was to the effect that many 
of the tires subject to these transactions were defective. 
Defendant's Exhibit 15 constituted a final accounting of all 
billable tires which obviously covers only half of the 70 tires 
shipped. Defendant's Exhibit 13 shows the inspection history 
and disposition of each individual tire. Half of these tires 
were found to be defective. Respondent's instruction and author-
ization given to Appellant to scrap the defective tires as 
before described, along with the correspondence between the 
parties as reflected in Plaintiff's Exhibits 8 and 10, establish 
that both parties were aware of a number of defective tires 
in addition to those covered by the credit memorandum. 
(2) Appellant gave proper notice of its rejection 
of all defective tires and provided Respondent opportunities 
to inspect them. Respondent complained at trial that Appellant 
did not notify it of the number of defective tires until the 
meeting of November 29, 1975 (TR. 175, 11. 17-22). To that 
one must ask "So what?" The undisputed fact is that Respondent 
was given notice on November 29, 1975, which was rather prompt 
given the number of tires involved (70), the fact that shipments 
of tires were still being made in that same month (P. Ex. 1), 
and considering the nature of the inspection procedures 
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involved. In any event, there is no evidence in the record 
as to any obligation on the part of Appellant to provide writt, 
or more prompt notice than that which was in fact given in 
this case. The controlling statute regarding rejection of 
goods states: 
Rejection of goods must be within a reason-
able time after their delivery or tender. It 
is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably 
notifies the seller." §70A-2-602(1) 
It cannot be reasonably said in this case that the 
notice given on November 29, 1975, within a few weeks of the k 
shipment, was less than "seasonable." 
Respondent was indisputably put on notice in this 
regard on November 29, 1975. On that occasion Appellant prepar; 
and submitted to Respondent's employee its final accounting 
of billable tires (D. Ex. 15), which obviously excluded many 
of the tires shipped (TR. 159, 11. 26-28), and they specificall 
discussed the matter of defective tires and their disposal. 
Appellant also testified that it submitted a workshE' 
(D. Ex. 13) on each tire to Respondent showing the inspection 
results; this, however, it denied. Respondent further denied 
that it was invited to inspect the defective tires on that 
occasion as Appellant alleged, but Respondent suggests neithe'. 
that its employee requested an opportunity to inspect nor was 
prevented from inspecting the defective tires which the parties 
admittedly discussed on that occasion. 
. ·or· Jl.ppellant further inr · 
Respondent as to the location of all defective tires in ordec 
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:o faciliate their inspection by Respondent by its letter 
of December 10, 1975 (P. Ex. 10). 
The fact is that Appellant did absolutely everything 
within its power to put Respondent on notice as to the number of 
defective tires and to facilitate Respondent's inspection of 
them. 
Nevertheless, Respondent did absolutely nothing 
to inspect or double-check those tires which Appellant had rejected 
as being unrecappable. The tires were not destroyed and were 
available for inspection at all times. 
Once seasonable notice of rejection was given it 
became incumbent upon Respondent to conduct its own inspection 
in order to assure itself as to the condition of the tires 
or forego the right to claim that they were good and demand 
payment for the same. It was Respondent's own failure to act 
in this regard that placed itself and Appellant in the present 
situation, of which Respondent should not now be allowed to 
take advantage. Otherwise, it will always be in the interests 
of one in Respondent's position to refrain from acting, thereby 
enabling one to claim "as far as we knew the goods were fit 
fur the purpose for which they were sold." It should not be 
allowed to better its position to the detriment of Appellant 
because of its own failure to act. 
(3) Appellant made payment in an amount $50.00 short 
of full payment for all recaopable tires. The evidence shows 
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that on November 29, 1975, the parties determined the outstandi: 
balance of payment to be $4,825.00, which did not take into 
account a check which was in the mail for the sum of $2,025.00 
(D. Ex. 9). Plaintiff subsequently issued a check for what 
it calculated the balance to be in the sum of $2,750.00 (P. Ex, 
1Lrecomputation of this accounting shows Appellant to have been 
in error in the sum of $50.00. To that extent, and to that 
extent only, Respondent is entitled to judgment. 
The Unconditional Agreement 
Although Appellant maintains (1) that the court did 
not make a finding of fact as to the important issue regarding 
the nature of the subject agreement, (2) that the express findir 
do not permit an inference in Respondent's favor to the effect 
that the agreement was unconditional, and (3) that the evidence 
does not support such a finding whether express or implied, 
consideration should be given to the other side of this argume~· 
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the original agreement 
was unconditional and Appellant neither had the right of 
reasonable inspection nor the right of rejection of goods unfit 
for the purpose for which they were purchased; nevertheless, 
on November 29, 1975, these parties negotiated the final balan·: 
owing on Appellant's account to be $4,825.00 for all tires 
shipped. Appellant paid all but $50.00 of this amount. 
As mentioned before, Respondent's employee traveled 
to Tucson, Arizona, and on that occasion met with Appellant's 
representatives for the express purpose of collecting the unF' 
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balance of the purchase price for the subject tires. One would 
fully expect, and the evidence shows, that after traveling a 
thousand miles, Respondent would at least identify the balance 
of the total debt due. That sum was calculated by these parties 
to be $ 4 , 8 2 5 . 0 0 • 
The Respondent's testimony on this point was as follows: 
Q. [Respondent's counsel] And in connection 
with that [payment of money owed] you 
had discussed with him [Appellant's 
employee, Arlo Murken] sending you a check 
for forty-eight twenty-five? 
A. Correct. 
(TR. 111, 11. 10-12) 
Q. [Appellant's counsel] Wasn't there any 
question as to the amount of the tires 
that were received and the amount of the 
tires for which payment allegedly was 
due? 
A. The only thing I was looking for was the 
balance of the money due on the invoices. 
He and I did not inspect the tires down 
there at all. 
Q. Now, how did you arrive then at the figure 
that you said was due and owing of forty-
eight hundred plus dollars? 
A. Mr. Murken and I agreed on each individual 
tire price here and we wrote it up on the 
invoice as such and he accepted it that 
way. 
Q. And so you agreed at that time that there 
was due and owing 4,825 dollars? 
A. An approximation, yes. 
(TR. 118, 11. 6-19) 
Q. So at the time you were in Arizona which 
would be October or November the 28th, 
29th, in that area, you agreed that the 
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amount owing to you was four thousand 
eight hundred and twenty-five dollars? 
A. Right. 
(TR. 119, 11. 4-8) 
During the trial both counsel and the trial judge 
disagreed as to what Respondent's witness had said in his prior 
testimony respecting this point. Both the court and counsel 
for Respondent contended that the witness had not testified 
that he had agreed that the balance of the unpaid purchase 
price as $4,825.00. The following clarification was then 
immediately made by Respondent's own witness: 
MR. LEWIS: They agreed four thousand 
eight hundred twenty-five dollars was 
owing. 
THE COURT: I didn't understand him to 
say that. 
MR. LEWIS: Let me ask the question. 
Q, {Mr. Lewis) Isn't it true 
at that time you agreed that's what 
was due and owing? 
A. Yes. 
(TR. 120 I 11. 8-14). 
In the interest of fairness, Appellant must represen: 
to this court that notwithstanding the foregoing substantial 
testimony of Respondent on this particular point, its witness 
did change his testimony on this point following the noon rece: 
(TR. 164, 11. 8-12) 
,, 
Appellant maintains, however, that Respor .. 
change of story and self-serving testimony late in the trial i: 
not only highly suspect but insufficient to rebut its own pre' 
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testimony on this point, give-iat least at three different times 
in the trial. This is especially evident in light of the fact 
that the comparatively substantial testimony given in this 
regard was in response to questions from both counsel and at 
one point followed a very clear argument to the point between 
counsel and the court as to whether or not Respondent had agreed 
to accept this sum as full payment; Respondent then again 
testified that $48,25.00 was agreed upon as the amount owing. 
It was also clearly established by Respondent's evidence 
that all tires which it had shipped had been received by Appellant 
prior to the November 29, 1975 meeting. In this regard, Respondent's 
witness testified that he was sure the tires had arrived prior to 
that occasion (TR. 121, 17-19). Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 shows that 
the last invoice is dated November 6, 1975 and Respondent's 
witness testified that shipment would have been within a "day 
or so" following the day of the invoice (TR. 121, 11. 5-8). 
In other words, there was no serious contention that the account-
ing of November 29, 1975 was made prior to shipment or receipt 
of all of the subject tires. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 6, a routine end-of-the-month 
statement of account, is of no significant consequence. There 
is no evidence in the record as to who prepared this statement, 
and certainly it could not have been prepared by Respondent's 
witness, 11r. Albertson, inasmuch as his own calendar (P. Ex. 16) 
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shows that he was either in Tucson, Arizona, or returning home 
therefrom on the date of said statement. There is no evidence 
as to whether the statement was sent to Appellant or whether 
it was received by Appellant. In any event, it appears to 
be a routine monthly billing prepared without knowledge of 
the accounting and agreement struck between these parties on 
November 29, 1975. 
Finally, there is no dispute as to the fact that Appe:1 
made payment on all but $50.00 on the unpaid purchase price as 
agreed on November 29, 1975. on that occasion, the parties 
prepared Defendant's Exhibit 15 showing the unpaid balance 
in the sum of $4,825.00, which failed to take into account 
Appellant's check in the sum of $2,025.00 (P. Ex. 3). Cons-
quently, Appellant issued a check in the sum of $2,750.00 (P. 
Ex. 5) with a letter of explanation dated December 5, 1976 
(P. Ex. 9). With those payments Appellant paid its account 
balance down to $50.00. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE 
TRIAL COURT DO NOT SUPPORT A JUDGMENT 
ASSESSING INTEREST AGAINST APPELLANT ON 
THE AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMENT AT THE RATE OF 
6.00 PER CENT PER ANNUM FROM DECEMBER 19, 
1975, AMOUNTING TO $641.13 WITH INTEREST 
ON THE TOTAL JUDGMENT AT THE RATE OF 8.00 
PER CENT PER ANNUM FROM THE DATE OF SAID 
JUDGMENT. 
The record is absolutely devoid of any proof or evide·• 
or request of any kind that interest be assessed at the rate 0 
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6.00 per cent per annum from Decewber 19, 1975 to the date 
of the judgment. Respondent neither prayed for such relief 
in its complaint nor requested the same at the time of trial. 
Furthermore, although Respondent did pray in its 
complaint for interest to be assessed on the judgment, no proof 
or evidence was profered at the time of trial in support of its 
right to claim such relief. Appellant submits that the trial 
court erred in unilaterally granting such relief without any 
basis of foundation whatsoever in the record. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, Appellant respectfully submits that the 
trial court erred in the following particulars: 
1. No finding was made as to the central issue of 
fact regarding the nature of the underlying agreement, i.e., 
did Appellant unconditionally agree to purchase any and all tires 
which Respondent choose to ship without even seeing all of 
them and without the right to inspect and reject those which 
were not fit for the purpose for which they were purchased, or 
did Appellant agree to purchase only those tires which were 
recappable. 
2. The evidence and express findings of fact do 
not support or permit an inference to be made that the under-
lying agreement was unconditional in nature. 
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3. As a matter of law, Appellant retained the 
right of reasonable inspection of all tires to ascertain 
their fitness for recapping and to reject those which were 
unrecappable. 
4. In addition to those 11 defective tires covered 
by the credit memorandum of November 10, 1975, there were 
defective tires for which no credit was given. 
5. Appellant gave Respondent proper notice of its 
rejection of those defective tires and provided every oppor-
tunity for Respondent to inspect them. Although Appellant 
did everything it could have done under the circumstances, 
Respondent simply elected not to inspect those tires which 
Appellant found to be defective, and, in fact, authorized 
Appellant. to dispose of the defective tires at Appellant's wff 
6. Appellant owes only $50.00 on its account with 
Respondent for the tires it agreed to purchase. 
7. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the 
subject agreement was unconditional, as Respondent contends, 
these parties agreed upon the sum of $4,825.00 as the remaininc 
balance due and owing for all tires. Appellant paid all but 
$50.00 of this amount. 
8. The trial court erred in granting Respondent 
relief in the nature of pre-judgment and post-judgment interes· 
without any support in the pleadings of evidence whatsoever. 
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Attorneys for Appellant 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the 
foregoing Appellant's Brief to F. Robert Bayle, Attorney for 
Respondent, 1105 Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, postage prepaid, this 4th day of April, 1978. 
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